Summary
Observation of another's action can selectively facilitate the brain's motor circuits for making the same action [1] [2] [3] . A ''mirror-matching mechanism'' might map observed actions onto the observer's own motor representations [4, 5] . Crucially, this view suggests that the brain represents others' actions like one's own. However, this hypothesis has been difficult to test because the experience of one's own body differs from that of others' bodies with respect to viewpoint, morphological features, familiarity, and the hallmark feature of kinaesthetic experience. We used an established method for manipulating the sense of body ownership (''rubber-hand illusion'') to compare effects of observing actions that either were or were not illusorily attributed to the subject's own body. We show that observing another's actions facilitated the motor system, whereas observing identical actions, which were illusorily attributed to the subject's own body, showed the opposite pattern. Thus, motor facilitation strongly depends on the agent to whom the observed action is attributed. This result contradicts previous concepts of equivalence between one's own actions and actions of others and suggests that social differentiation, not equivalence, is characteristic of the human action system.
Results and Discussion
Mirror matching has strong implications for the selfother distinction [6] . The purpose of the mirror system appears to be social because it represents others in order to understand their actions [4] . It also implies a shared representation [6, 7] between ourselves and others because the same neuronal representations are activated for actions made by either agent. However, we do not normally confuse others with ourselves; we can clearly attribute actions to either ourselves or to another agent. Classical mirror-matching theories are silent on how the brain performs this attribution. In one more recent view, actions are initially represented in a motoric but agent-neutral format (''shared representation''). In this view, motor facilitation should be equal for observation of either one's own actions or those of another agent. Perceptual identification of an action as one's own or as another's would then involve an additional process (the ''Who'' system), which attributes actions to specific agents, perhaps on the basis of viewpoint-specific body representations in the occipital cortex [8, 9] .
Alternatively, mirror matching may involve derivative representation of another's actions. Because ''the other is like the self'' [7] , observing another's actions should partially activate the corresponding structures in one's own brain. In this view, motor facilitation should occur during observation of both one's own actions and those of others but should be greater for self-observation. Finally, a radical hypothesis suggests that representation of one's own actions may derive from representation of another's actions: ''me like you'' [7] . Motor facilitation should then be greater during observation of the actions of others than when observing one's own.
Action-observation studies have rarely investigated the self-other distinction directly, so these three predictions have not been explicitly compared. An ideal experiment would compare cortical excitability during observation of one's own actions or those of another person. However, these two situations normally differ in their sensorimotor context as well as in social respects, making unambiguous interpretation difficult. For example, viewpoint, morphological, and familiarity differences between one's own body and those of others mean that visual stimulation would differ across conditions. In addition, observing one's own action involves not only visual experience, but also efferent and afferent experiences of action. These experiences are absent when one is watching others' actions [10] . A more direct comparison between subjects' perception of self and their perception of others may come from holding visual and proprioceptive inputs constant and using topdown factors to induce subjects to treat a single visual input as their own body or another's.
We thus manipulated body ownership by using the rubber-hand illusion. We then investigated how attributing a viewed hand to the self or to another person influenced action observation (Figures 1 and 2 ; see also the Supplemental Experimental Procedures available online). When subjects watch a rubber hand being stroked while they feel synchronous stroking of their own unseen hand, they feel that the rubber hand becomes part of their body [11, 12] . Identical asynchronous stroking has no effect [12, 13] . Thus, the sense of owning the rubber hand requires congruence of visual and tactile *Correspondence: s.bosbach@psychol.ucl.ac.uk stimulation. The neural counterparts of this sense of ownership have been identified in premotor [14] and sensorimotor cortices [15] . The rubber-hand illusion therefore allows balanced comparison between the self and the other because a single stimulus (here, the hand of another person rather than a rubber hand) is either linked to the self or not depending on the pattern of previous stimulation. We used a real human hand instead of the conventional rubber hand because several studies show stronger mirroring effects for viewing a live action than for viewing artificial equivalents [16] [17] [18] [19] .
We then used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to directly compare action facilitation effects produced by watching an action attributed to another's body with the facilitation effects produced by observing actions of a body that appears to be one's own. The rubber-hand illusion and the motor facilitation to TMS are established paradigms for manipulating ownership and for studying cortical mirroring mechanisms, respectively [1, 11] . We have combined these techniques to compare cortical representation for actions performed by the self and others. This approach permits an experimental answer to a traditional conceptual question in social cognitive neuroscience: Do we represent others as a derivative of ourselves (''you like me''), do we represent ourselves as derivatives of others (''me like you''), do we represent actions in an agent-neutral way [6, 20] , or do we represent other agents as quite different from ourselves? Figure 3 shows mean motor-evoked potential (MEP) amplitudes in each condition for subjects' right first-dorsal interosseus (FDI) and right abductor digiti minimi (ADM). The latter served as a control muscle irrelevant to the observed action. Baseline MEP amplitude did not differ between pretest and posttest blocks (p > 0.4), so baseline data were averaged. All experimental conditions produced MEP increases above the baseline for FDI (p < 0.006) but not for ADM (p > 0.3). To compare MEPs between experimental conditions, we therefore calculated a facilitation ratio by normalizing each subject's experimental MEP amplitudes by using that subject's average baseline MEP amplitude.
Cortical Excitability
To investigate whether the sense of ownership affected cortical mechanisms of action observation, we performed 2 3 2 ANCOVAs on the facilitation ratios for each muscle by using factors of ownership (self-synchronous/ other-asynchronous) and observed experimenter action (no action/experimenter action; Figure 3 ; see also Figure S2) . We controlled for the known facilitation of MEPs by background EMG level [21] by including EMG activity as a covariate ( Figure S3 ).
Facilitation ratios for FDI showed no main effects of either ownership or observed-experimenter action (F 1,12 = 1; p > 0.5) but a significant interaction between these factors (F 1,12 = 6.97; p = 0.023). Observation of an experimenter's index-finger movements facilitated MEPs in the other-asynchronous condition but suppressed them in the self-synchronous condition relative to observation of a static hand. Identical analysis showed no interaction in the ADM (p = 0.984).
We used an established bodily illusion to manipulate body ownership and then compared the cortical representation of observed actions linked to the self or to another agent. A version of the rubber-hand illusion [11] [12] [13] allowed to us to control experimentally whether subjects experienced that an experimenter's hand was in fact their own. We then compared MEPs evoked by motor cortical TMS at the time that the observed hand made voluntary actions with MEPs recorded in randomly interleaved control trials when the subject viewed the experimenter's static hand. Action observation facilitated the subjects' own motor system when the moving hand was attributed to another agent. Conversely, when the subjects experienced the experimenter's hand as belonging to their own body, action observation had a qualitatively The subject sat resting his or her right arm on a table. The arm was hidden under a surface, which could appear either as a mirror or as transparent glass, according to computer-controlled illumination under the surface. An experimenter's right arm was positioned in front of the subject's midline. The illumination was controlled so that the subject could either see this arm or not. The distance between the subject's and the experimenter's hands was 34 cm. Tactile stimulation was applied simultaneously to the subject's and the experimenter's index finger by two identical paintbrushes mounted on computer-controlled motors. In the synchronous condition, the two paintbrushes stroked the subject and the experimenter with identical onset times, directions, speeds, and durations. In the asynchronous condition, the two paintbrushes moved with different onset times, directions, speeds, and durations, but the total stimulation of the skin was identical. Synchronous stroking induced the illusion that the experimenter's hand was part of the subject's own body (see Figure S1 ). Once the illusion was established, the experimenter's index finger made unpredictable abduction movements. On some trials, the subject received a TMS pulse over the motor cortex shortly after observing the experimenter's action so that how observation of action influenced cortical excitability could be probed. different effect and tended to suppress rather than increase cortical excitability. The interaction was specific to the muscle involved in the observed action. There were no main effects of either the rubber-hand illusion (synchronous versus asynchronous) or of the observed action itself on cortical excitability. This excludes nonspecific accounts based on increases in cortical excitability due to illusions or due to the arousal value of visual or biological motion.
Enhanced cortico-spinal excitability during action observation has been reported previously [1] [2] [3] 22] . We replicated this basic effect and extended it in a number of ways. First, previous studies have compared MEPs measured in the context of extended periods of action observation or baseline blocks. Using a more eventrelated approach, we compared facilitation evoked by viewing a hand that either did or did not perform an action on randomly interleaved trials. We show that cortical facilitation involves an immediate and somatotopically specific response to a currently observed action and cannot be attributed to longer-term contextual fluctuations of the subject's cortical state.
Second, we show that action observation produces somatotopically specific effects in the motor cortex. Viewing index-finger movements influenced the excitability of circuits controlling the subject's index-finger muscle but had no effect on circuits controlling a muscle moving the little finger [2] . In other words, our results confirm a fine somatotopic distribution that can target individual digits within the same motor map [23] .
Most importantly, our study shows a clear difference between the cortical effects of observing actions linked to the self and actions performed by others. Observing others' actions facilitated the motor system. Observing an identical action that was attributed to one's own body had a quite different effect. This suggests that the neural mechanisms underlying action observation are intrinsically social. These mechanisms map the actions of others to corresponding actions on one's own body but do not simply represent the other agent as a derivative of [7] , or even an equal to, the self. Our results support neither ''you like me'' theories of social cognition nor theories of ''shared representation.'' Such theories require a common, agent-neutral representation for one's own actions and for the actions of others [6, 20] . In contrast, we found a significantly agent-specific representation in the primary motor cortex.
A few studies have previously attempted to investigate the self-other distinction in action observation. One study [24] measured cortical excitability while subjects watched videos of their own hand or another person's hand performing index-finger abduction movements. They found facilitation above a baseline in both cases but no difference between self and other observation. Our results clearly contradict this finding. We speculate that their stimuli may not have generated an unambiguous self-other difference. Indeed, Daprati et al. found that subjects frequently attributed another person's hand to themselves when they were shown videos of either their own or another person's manual Subjects watched an experimenter's hand being stroked while they felt similar stroking of their own unseen hand. Visual and tactile stimulation could be synchronous or asynchronous, according to block. In a subsequent experimental stage, occasional synchronous stroking was interspersed with passive observation of occasional finger movements made by the experimenter. The observed actions were followed by TMS on random trials.
actions [25] . Here, we have controlled the linkage of observed action to the self or to another person by using the rubber-hand illusion rather than relying on explicit subject reports.
Maeda et al. [26] reported greater MEP facilitation for first-person than for third-person views of grasping action. However, this may reflect a purely visual, rather than social, difference. Saxe et al. [27] compared brain activation when subjects viewed static body-part images from egocentric and heterocentric perspectives. They found greater BOLD responses in the sensory cortex for egocentric than for heterocentric views, suggesting that visual perspective could influence sensorimotor systems independently of action observation. Our study, in contrast, kept visual stimulation constant across conditions and manipulated the attribution of actions to the self or to another person with an established illusion of body ownership.
Could the absence of facilitation in our self condition be due to a cognitive conflict derived from a mismatch between visual and proprioceptive feedback? In this condition, subjects observed actions of a hand that they attributed to themselves, but the kinaesthetic feedback associated with normal voluntary action was absent. Several strands of evidence suggest that the lack of facilitation in the self condition reflects a genuine feature of neural representation of actions attributed to the self and not merely a response to intersensory conflict. First, intersensory conflict per se did not influence cortical excitability. The asynchronous stroking condition of the rubber-hand illusion induced a dramatic conflict between visual and somatosensory information but did not produce a main effect of stroking pattern on MEP facilitation. Second, questionnaire responses and proprioceptive measurements both suggest that any intersensory conflict due to the observation of self-actions was minimal. Specifically, the rubber-hand illusion was as strong in the induction phase, where no intersensory conflict was present, as in the experimental phase, where such conflict may have occurred. Third, functional imaging studies of conflict between visual feedback and motor intention have not reported suppression of primary motor or premotor areas [28, 29] . Indeed, studies of conflict focus on prefrontal areas that generally have excitatory projections to the motor system [28, 29] . Thus, absence of facilitation for one's own action cannot easily be explained as a response to conflict. Rather, we suggest that cortical suppression is a functional response to viewing one's own actions. Brass et al. [30] have reported an anterior frontomedial and right temporoparietal inhibitory network that suppresses a natural tendency to imitate others and thus prevents inappropriate responses. This would be even more important for preventing inappropriate perseveration or entrainment when viewing one's own actions. In normal voluntary action, this observation-evoked suppression may be masked by the additional cortical facilitation associated with motor output [21] .
In conclusion, our results confirm that observation of others facilitates the motor system. The facilitation is caused by immediate observation of the current action. Moreover, facilitation strongly depends on the agent to whom the observed action is attributed. Actions attributed to another person facilitate the observer's motor system, whereas observations of one's own actions do not, and in fact such observations tend to suppress the observer's motor system. The motor system therefore includes a representation of other agents as qualitatively different from the self. The motor system differentiates between the self and the other rather than equates them. Our results strongly support previous suggestions that the motor system plays a key role in social cognition [4] and may underlie key developments in human social evolution, such as communication and social interaction. 
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